Being prepared for when things do not work out as planned is important. But planning for failure, is not planning to fail.
"Fate has ordained that the men who went to the moon to explore in peace will stay on the moon to rest in peace."
This is the opening of the speech President Nixon would have given the world, had the Apollo moon landings failed in 1969. At the time it was one of the most complex endeavours humans had ever attempted, with high risk, but an immense preparation for these risks, and the many measures to control them.
I hope 2015, brings you the best of outcomes, from the risks you choose to take, in full knowledge that they may not work out as perfectly as planned. But being prepared to minimise these bad events, will make the chance of many more good outcomes likely.
Its always good to shoot for the stars. But be ready and able to have the resources for a second and third Shot!
Blog and Discussion on the Psychology of Investing & Trading, Personal Development as an Investor, Reviews of Books on Investing. #investment, #trading, #stocks, #market, #spy, #qqq, #dow, #investor, #trader, #money, #psychology, #psych
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
Thursday, December 18, 2014
Leverage – The Bringer of Destruction. Risk vs Return.
I recently saw this chart of “Max Drawdown % Risk” verses “Return
%”, of a large number of traders on the SaxoBank website.
Interesting!
Firstly and obviously, zero risk is zero return. Returns rise from this point until the
number of 50% return-makers flatlines from 8% - 30% max drawdown risk, (lower horizontal
green line). It then seems to
start to fall along the top of the cluster above the red trend.
As risk increases, the red trend is far more significant to
the downside in an almost linear relationship. Over 80% max drawdown risk seems to imply a return
approaching 100% loss.
If you look at the overall cluster running along the top of
the red line, it seems safe to say, that increasing risk does not constitute
increasing returns for most traders.
The top performers (who must take some risk to generate a return)
sit in the 40-55% max drawdown risk range.
No-one with 75% max drawdown risk or more has doubled their
money.
The greatest cluster of 100% return-makers, sits somewhere
around the 20-30% max drawdown risk range, (upper horizontal green line). This
seems to be a reasonable place to be when you include the possible returns
below it as well.
Importantly, these are just subjective eyeball observations,
and the traders here are most likely using a variety of strategies, and are of
varying skill/experience. A bigger
sample size would also be great to have, (820 on the website).
Humans have a great awareness of risk through survival
instincts, but this does not seem to translate into the markets!
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Sunday, December 14, 2014
China – Causes for Concerns.
A few weeks ago I wrote a blog about the parallels between
The Japanese Bubble Economy of the 90’s and how I see China now.
Today another concern to add to the list popped up, after
the recent run-up of the Shanghai Exchange.
China is adding money to its financial system to fuel
growth, as forecast growth rates continue to fall. While doing this, China’s leaders and state media are using
the statement of a “new normal” of slower growth as expectation management on investors’
appetites.
I love the term “new normal” as a contrarian signal, telling
me that it will not end anywhere like what is being expressed in relation to
it. (As example: a “new normal” of
low volatility from now on – I would see as high volatility to come!) The more “new normal” talk there is,
and belief in the concept – the more it is impossible to be true.
A new normal of “slower, high quality growth,” is coming to
China. Uhuh-sure!
When you pump money into banks to ensure liquidity, as
recent history shows, its usually too late to save a bad outcome. And I don’t think anyone knows the
depths to how bad the banking and property sectors are in China really – not
even the government. There
seems to be way too much regional government intervention and corruption for
that.
Share buybacks, and state-owned company share investments,
that were “encouraged” by the authorities, have pushed up stock prices enticing
local and now foreign investors into the share market at elevated prices.
Due to this recent run in Chinese stocks (17% this month,
35% this year), China banks have suffered investor withdrawals to fund their
entry into the stock market. Much
of that has then been leveraged.
Margin use in total trading has almost doubled since May, and non-bank
trust companies are lending up to 300% of capital!
Loose margin requirements, which have not been tightened
recently despite liquidity concerns, threaten only to cause more big drops
similar to the decline Tuesday, that was the biggest one-day drop since the GFC,
on fears of tightening requirements for margin credit.
Japanese use of margin at ridiculous levels, especially in
property prices tells us that this kind of leverage is unlikely to lead to “slower
but quality growth.”
This “new normal” could just be masking the high volatility
to come. Clearly, investors do not
seem to learn from history. Nor
consider the psychological implications of a run of margin calls as banks with
liquidity problems tighten up.
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Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Taleb’s “Alternative Histories” and Investing.
“Clearly my way of
judging matters is probalistic in nature; it relies on the notion of what could
have probably happened….
If
we have heard of {histories greatest generals and inventors}, it is simply
because they took considerable risks, along with thousands of others, and
happened to win. They were
intelligent, courageous, noble (at times), had the highest possible obtainable culture
of their day – but so did thousands of others who live in the musty footnotes
of history.” (Taleb, Fooled by
Randomness).
Julius Caesar was a fantastic general, yet was amazingly
lucky (until he was not), whereas Erwin Rommel, also a fantastic general was
plagued by bad luck on multiple occasions, (with a random and erratic Commander
in Chief not helping).
What other outcomes for these generals could have
happened? And, would they be
judged by history differently for their decisions, despite no change in their
skills?
“Every once in a
while, someone makes a risky bet on an improbable or uncertain outcome and ends
up looking like a genius,” (Marks, The Most Important Thing), … or a fool.
But how do I picture these alternative histories that could
have occurred but did not?
(I saw this graph somewhere but couldn’t re-find it, so
recreated it below).
At point X now, current conditions are known (as best as
available information can be utilized).
The correct decision (always) to take is the one that is logical, intelligent,
and informed “at that time” (Marks).
At point X now, all red outcomes are “possible” and unknown,
but some are more “probable” than others.
At point Y later, only a single red outcome has eventuated. At which point it often becomes
hard to imagine that any of the others were “possible” to begin with.
(Note: The distribution in reality may be skewed towards one
side of possible outcomes. This is
more to highlight the concept of possible and probable only, not the
mathematics).
When things go as predicted (luck playing a role), people
tend to look like geniuses for their correct actions. “Coincidences look
like causality. A lucky idiot
looks like a skilled investor.” (Marks). However, the correctness or quality of a decision
cannot be judged by its outcome, especially if randomness is involved. For this reason correct decisions based
on a sound process are often wrong, and the macro events that may have caused
it, beyond anticipating. Incorrect
decisions and processes can also be seen
as correct, with an unanticipated event causing the outcome you wanted.
Whilst the mean is the most “probable” outcome (reversion to
the mean?), it is not at all certain, as for any individual situation, all
outcomes are “possible”. In fact
the collective likelihood of all the other outcomes is higher than the one we
think is most probable!
The most extreme outliers at +3s and - 3s can be the black swans (good and
bad). (Maybe there should be black swans AND white knights?).
At least by having a good process at X, we can limit the
pain of black swan events and not necessarily experience account destruction
when they do occur. We must trade
based on what we think are probable outcomes, while not doing too much damage
or loss in the rest that occur.
We need to cut off the bad tails effect on us, or limit it. Fortunately options do that, yet expose
us to the full range of favorable possibilities.
This does not mean to imply not trading a contrarian
strategy, or positioning to get lucky etc. Its what we think are probable and possible, based on our
analysis, not probable as in the herd thinks it likely.
I think understanding that we can’t know the outcome of all
that is possible, but can try to understand what is probable and position
accordingly, whilst protecting the risk of severe damage to my account, is the
best thing I have learnt in 2014.
(Possibly! Probably!)
Clearly some “alternative histories” would have been far
worse than the one we know. But in
1940, our now known outcome was
nowhere near certain, and one could argue improbable. The things that HAVE happened in the world are just a “small subset of the things that COULD have
happened.” And finally, “ensure survival” (Marks).
(If you want to think more about alternative histories, watch
the Back to the Future movies!)
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Friday, December 5, 2014
The Importance of Reversion To the Mean in Investing. (Part 2)
The Three Illusions of Reversion to the Mean. (Part 2)
Reversion to the mean creates three illusions - cause and
effect, feedback and declining variance, (Mauboussin, The Success Equation).
1. Illusion of
Cause and Effect – The human mind has an innate programming to want to explain
occurrences by finding the cause of them, even if there isn’t one. Yet, reversion to the mean is a
“statistical artifact,” that our minds try to interpret with a cause that often
is not there, (Mauboussin).
Reversion to the Mean “happens without the need of a
cause.” This is problematic to our
minds with that need to assign one, even if it causes an error.
“The DOW fell 2% on the back of weak employment data.” No – it probably just regressed back
towards its 50 day Moving Average, more likely.
2. Illusion of
Feedback – The idea here is that after an event, you take an action and believe
that this causes the next event to occur as a result of that, even though reversion
to the mean might be all that is occurring.
Mauboussin’s example of doctors is: You have higher blood
pressure than your last consultation, which the doctor treats with a drug. Blood pressure subsequently lowers
towards the average at the next consultation, which the doctor believes is due
to his treatment (which it may, or may not be). But in the whole population, everyone’s blood pressure would
revert towards the mean with or without treatment.
The illusion of feedback will persuasively suggest that the
treatment was the cause and lower blood pressure the effect,” (Mauboussin). Clearly the illusion of feedback plays
right into the hands of the illusion of cause and effect, and the narrative
produced can be a strong and highly erroneous belief.
3. The illusion
of Declining Variance – (the hardest to conceptualize) is the illusion that as
something moves to its average, the variation in the numbers shrinks. This is not necessarily the case, and
sets a trap in our analysis. In
other words as stock price reverts to its mean, it does not imply that the individual
prices observed will cluster closer together around the mean, as would be
evident by a closer standard deviation.
The chart below shows how price reverts to its mean at P
from Po, variance increases initially as price begins to move, but then
stabilizes, yet does not contract, as the illusion would dictate.
Also, reversion to the mean occurs even when the statistical
properties of the distribution remain unchanged (Mauboussin). According to Bob Jensen at Trinity
University it looks like this:
The red line can be flipped to show a declining price
reversion to the mean with similar variance results.
Mauboussin’s final point on the Illusion of Declining
Variance offers the warning that; “None of this is to say that results cannot
exhibit a decline in variance over time… But just because you observe reversion
to the mean, that’s doesn’t suggest that individual outcomes are converging
toward the average.”
Summary:
Reversion to the Mean does not need a cause.
We fail to predict to an adequate amount its effect when
making predictions about the future.
Reversion to the Mean is most pronounced at extremes. Things that are great won’t stay that
great, things that are terrible rarely stay that terrible.
When a lot of luck is involved Reversion to the Mean is
stronger, and inevitable.
The paradox of skill, (increases in the skills of investors
and access to information, has narrowed the skill variation in the population,
making luck more important in success), has lead to an increase in the power of
Reversion to the Mean, (Mauboussin).
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Monday, December 1, 2014
The Importance of Reversion To the Mean in Investing. (Part 1)
The definition at least, is simple: When something happens
that is not average, the following event is likely to be closer to the average.
But, the outcome is
difficult to predict, understand and prone to illusions.
Why is Reversion to the Mean important to consider? In cases where Luck plays a large role
in outcomes, such as prices of a stock, “Reversion to the mean is very
powerful,” and “failure to regress outcomes sufficiently” causes people to “buy
what has done well and sell what has done poorly” leading to the dumb money effect, (Mauboussin, The Success Equation). Further: “Any activity that combines
skill and luck will eventually revert to the mean.” Howard Marks, when referring to this uses the term cyclical, but I believe it’s essentially the same. But it’s important to realize that nothing can go up in
price forever and down is only limited by zero, but otherwise cant go down
forever.
Spierdijk & Bikker (2012), “Mean Reversion in Stock
Prices: Implications for long-term investors,” summarized much of the
literature. http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Working%20Paper%20343_tcm47-271856.pdf
Fama & French’s 1988 study explained 25%-40% of the
variation in stock returns on mean reversion in long term investments over one
year to ten years in duration.
Campbell & Shiller (2001) found that adjustments of the P/E ratio
towards an equilibrium level was more by the price of the stock than the
company fundamentals (price vs. quality).
Coakley & Fuertes (2006) found mean reversion behavior to be
attributable to investor sentiment.
Further, mean reversion in stock indices of whole countries was almost
absent in periods of low economic uncertainty, but of course very fast during
high uncertainty or crisis.
In investing, mean reversion can occur in essentially every
asset class, size of company, investing process, valuation model, and
geographical boundary due to the roles of luck or randomness.
Mauboussin argues that people usually fail to revert their
predictions sufficiently to the mean, and that its one of the biggest hazards
decision makers face. So it
makes sense that when price regresses it should move more to the mean than you
think it will, and that price often overshoots the
mean. The bigger the movement from
the old price to the mean, and the momentum of that move seems to imply the
possibility for a larger overshoot.
If everyone in the market is generally failing to calculate
the amount of reversion to the mean that may occur, it seems a great contrarian
view to take, that it will be greater than expected. Howard Marks (The Most Important Thing) discusses a paradox
where investors think quality rather than price is the main determinant of
whether something is risky, yet price is more correlated with risk than
quality. A high quality stock is
likely to be high priced and therefore far more at risk of reversion to the mean,
despite its positive sentiment.
Contrarian strategies based on mean reversion in stock
prices have been shown to yield excess returns, Balvers et al. (2000). Further, generating risk adjusted
excess returns by selling past winners, and buying past losers was profitable,
De Bondt & Thaler (1985). In
other words there is less risk in mean reverting stocks especially over long
investment periods.
However, evidence of the actual existence of mean reverting
behavior is harder to prove in stock prices, perhaps due to the difficulties in
empirical assessments of mean reversion, and a risk averse investor should base
investment decisions on conservative assumptions regarding mean reverting
behavior occurring in a given timeframe, especially shorter durations,
(Spierdijk & Bikker, 2012). But once it occurs, expect it to exceed
expectations of the magnitude of reversion.
Mean Reversion of a Slinky. (It always overshoots its mean!)
Summary:
Reversion to the Mean does not need a cause.
We fail to predict to an adequate amount its effect when
making predictions about the future.
Reversion to the Mean is most pronounced at extremes. Things that are great won’t stay that
great, things that are terrible rarely stay that terrible.
When a lot of luck is involved Reversion to the Mean is
stronger, and inevitable.
The paradox of skill, (increases in the skills of investors
and access to information, has narrowed the skill variation in the population,
making luck more important in success), has lead to an increase in the power of
Reversion to the Mean, (Mauboussin).
Untangling Skill & Luck – Mauboussin Article. Legg Mason
Capital Management. http://vserver1.cscs.lsa.umich.edu/~spage/ONLINECOURSE/R15SkillandLuck.pdf
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